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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall
1 What a strange idea runs through this book! Not the author’s, of course, but Mao’s,
when he sent students from high schools and universities to be educated by illiterate
peasants. Admittedly, his admirers would later outstrip him by emptying Phnom Penh
of its entire population, but still, he showed them the way.
2 It was such an aberration that some contemporary sceptical observers, searching for a
“reasonable” explanation, imagined that Mao must have meant to relieve the pressure
of new entrants onto the urban labour market. Admittedly, there was an even greater
surplus of labour in the countryside, but a few more or a few less would not be noticed!
Bonnin magisterially sweeps these demographic arguments aside (pp. 68-70, 436-7, et
al.)  and in  general  he dismisses  any socio-economic account  of  the motives  behind
Mao’s mad decision. The other, more “positive” motive attributed to Mao, namely the
development of the hinterland and the frontier regions, fares no better at Bonnin’s
hands, since the “educated youth” (zhiqing) were not put to work in accordance with
their skills, even if only to keep accounts or to teach the illiterate, but were simply
added  to  an  agricultural  labour  force  which  was  already  over-supplied  with  more
competent people already hardened by such work. 
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3 That leaves the ideological and political motives: to train revolutionary successors and
to get rid of any red guards stubborn enough to cling to the slogan that “to rebel is
right”, just when the Prophet himself was revising his earlier pronouncement (pardon
the  sacrilege:  how  could  Mao  be  a  revisionist?)  because  it  had  led  to  catastrophic
results. Each of these two motives played an important role, and although the second of
them arose out of particular circumstances, it was not purely opportunistic, since Mao
also wished to preserve and strengthen the forms of charismatic power, that is to say,
his own. So ideological motives were fundamental, and their aim was not only to give
the young softies who had not known Yenan a dose of its harsh schooling, but also to
narrow the social gap known as the “three differences”, and pursue other such lofty
aims, with which the Chinese (and French) media inundated us at the time.
4 Michel Bonnin’s argument is clear and convincing, and its conclusion provides us with
an uncompromising overall assessment of those two linked fields, namely the “socio-
economic” and the “politico-ideological”. In the end, there is virtually no distinction to
be drawn, for the record in both arenas is equally damning―except, of course, for the
short-term political  gain in ridding the cities  of  the red guards and re-establishing
order. Apart from that, the main difference lies in the fact that the socio-economic
balance sheet records no gain, but this is a lesser evil than the political and ideological
results, for these show that Mao’s aim of forging revolutionaries led to the production
of sceptics.
5 Moving from motives to results,  the main body of this work of over three hundred
pages consists of two very substantial sections and one, inevitably shorter, dealing with
the resistance by the people concerned. This was necessarily passive while Mao was
alive, but very active and visible when the changes introduced by Deng Xiaoping made
such things possible. Although this “overt resistance” of 1978-1979 is analysed at the
end of the later brief section (pp. 383-391), its nature is uncovered in a most striking
manner two hundred pages earlier (pp. 163-172), through the lengthy consideration
given  to  the  development  of  the  xiaxiang policy  of  sending  educated  youth  to  the
countryside. But here the reader encounters one of the stumbling blocks in the book’s
overall plan, broadly well organised and instructive though it is, because it forces the
author to go over the same ground several times. In order to understand the terminal
decline of the xiaxiang policy, ending in its actual demise, he finds it necessary to give
due weight to the social resistance which provoked it, before going on to consider that
resistance in its own right. The essence of the matter lies in the earlier considerations,
which  are  moreover  new  and  interesting.  I  myself  did  not  know  that  the  social
resistance had played such a large role.
6 Reading this  careful  analysis  of  the development of  the policy of  sending educated
youth  to  the  countryside  before,  during  and  after  the  Cultural  Revolution,  one
experiences moments of sheer pleasure in following such an informed, closely argued,
and severely critical presentation. But reading the next section, describing the lives of
the zhiqing banished to  the countryside,  the  pleasure  evaporates  in  the  face  of  the
disillusionment, poverty and sheer frustration of the generation of the policy’s victims.
The author’s tone is not one of righteous indignation, however. He blends his objective
analysis of the difficulties, in adapting to life in the countryside and becoming part of a
rural  community etc.,  with quasi-literary flights.  Restrained in tone,  these draw on
testimony from sources which are themselves literary works (by former zhiqing) and
from interviews which he has conducted in person since the mid-1970s. This section is
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deeply moving, and it is indispensable to recall it and bear it constantly in mind when
assessing the terrible disruptions brought about by the Great Helmsman’s lunacies. 
7 Back in 1977 Thomas Bernstein published a very good study of these issues, called Up to
the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China (Yale
University Press). But apart from the fact that most of the zhiqing were still wasting
away in the countryside at the time, the available data cannot be compared with what
Michel Bonnin had at his disposal. Thanks to him, we now have a definitive work on an
important topic which is far less well known than the red guards episode. Moreover, its
significance  is  greatly  enhanced  by  the  author’s  critical  reflections,  which  are  of
concern to all readers, sinologists or not.
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